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By the early English law, the most important
rights were those of the person. In the early times when
the people were in the habit of traveling from one place
to another and only stayed a little while in one place,
their p-roperty was chiefly personal.These rights and their
C, 1.
breach were the principal object of attention. Persons
wished to tran3fer their property for the property of their
neighbors, they wiished such property for the looks or
for the apparent worth of the article; and here driginated
the idea of implied condition of the article or warranty
7/hic1. b' the terms of the contract came to be of tvio kinds.
First, express Warranty, where there is an express guaranty
to answer in damages for any defect of the article.
Second, A guaranty/ implied from the condition of the
article sold, or from the special condition or statdard
of the article sold or barg liAed to be sold from the cir-
cumstanc3s of the case. The actions for breach of such
conditions came from the action on the case vihich was an
equitable action derived from the personal action of tres-
pass. The action on the case was held to lie at the suit
of the party grieved though the action w-s tiew and unpre-
cedented; for where the common law gives a right, or makes
a thing an injury, the same law gives a remedy.
.To particular phraseology is necessary to constitute
a warranty, any distinct assertion of the quality of the
goods made by the seller as an inducement to the purchaser
and relied on by the buyer, may be ground for finding
a warranty. :'4 Barb. 549.
But to constitute a warranty, there must be some expres-
sion of the seller amounting to an unequivocal affirmation,
relied on by the buyer, that the goods are of a certain
quality. 11ere expressions of opinion will not amount to a
warranty. An affirmation in regard to -n existing fact,
distiiict and positively made,in trade negotiations should
be regarded as a contract, and enforced as a warnantY.
A representation made by a vendor,upon a sale of
flour in barrels,that it is in quality superfineand worth
a shilling a barrel more than common,coupled with the as-
surance to purchasers agent, that he may rely upon such
representation, is - warranty of the quality of the flour.
Though in in action founded on a warranty of the
soundness of a chattel by the vendorit is necessary to
prove the warranty, yet it is not necessary for the plain-
tiff to show that the defendant madethe warranty in exprtss-
words; but tt\y represantation of the state of the thing
soldby the defendant, or a direct and express affirmation
by him, of its quality and condition, showing his intention
to warrant, will be sufficient.
In olden times if the par t ies wished to be more sure
of the v -Jth of the article they would demand the extra
assurance of what we call a warranty.
When one should require a warranty,- Each one in
ordinary cases,judges for himself,and relies confidently
upon the sufficiency of his own knowledge,skill anCL diligenc.
The common law affords every one a reasonable protection
against fraud in dealing;but it does not go to the romantic
length of giving indemnity against the consequences
of indolence and folly, or a careless indifference to the
ordinary and accessible means of information. It reconciles
the claims of convenience with the duties of good faith
to every extent compatible with tle interests of commerce.
This it does by requiring the purchaser to apply his atten-
tion to those particulars which may be supposed to be aithin
his reach of observation anc. judgment;and the vendor to
communicate those particulars and defects %vhiah cannot be
supposed to be immediately within the reach of such atten-
tion.If the,; purchaser be wanting in attention tb these
points,where attentiob would have been sufficient to pro-
tect him from surprise or imposition, the maxim "caveat
emptor" ( Let the purchaser beivare) ought to apply; and it
has been decided that if the buyer have an opportunity
of examining the article,the seller is not,answerable
for any secret defect,unless there be fraud,or an express
warranty, or such a direct statement as is tantamount to it.
The law requires the purchaser to attendwhen he makes
his contractto the quality of the article he buys,wvhich
are supposed to be within the reach of his observation and
judgment. If the seller is ignorant of any unsoundness or
defect which the article sold may have, and a more repre-
sentation of soundness will not render him liable; and if it
is intended to make him liable under s~ch circumstances,
he must require a viarrantythat the thing is sound or free
from defect. This general varranty is thereforefrequently
required on sales. And it extends to all cefects, except
such as are perfectly plain or known to the buyer; but
against the defects of such apparent failings as are per-
fectly obvious to the senses, ana Co not requi e any kind
of skill of pains to discover, this general warranty is no
protection; though if the seller should say or do any thing
whatever with an intention to divert the eye;or obscure
the observation of the buyer, oven to an open defect,
he would be guilty of an act of fraud. A warranty is not
a protection against a secret defect if the buyer be in-
formed therof,even though the warranty b. in writing and
contain no exception, against the effect of a visible or
known defect,the buyer should exact a special warranty,
or he is wothout a remedy, even though he gives The pri(e
of a sound commodity. 4-general warranty is always in the
present tense, that the article is souid or free from vice
not that the article %,will be hereafter. Cowens Treatise,§ 42.
What constitutes a warranty,- A warranty of goods must
be made upon the sale and not after, for then it is without
consideration, so when upon a treaty for a sale and warranty
made all is broken off, such a warranty will not extend to
'i subsequent sal e though i t would be otherwise if I warrant
a horse oefore sal e, and another buyer buys him ii. urediately
for thd3ale is upon the strength of thw warranty. But if
when the parties are in treaty respecting the skle,the owner
offers to warran tthe articlethe warrant will be binding
although the sale does not take place until some days
afterwards. 11 Wen. 586.
No particular phraseology is necessary to constitute a
warranty, any distinct assektionof the quality of the goods
made by the seller as an inducement to the purchase and
relied on by the buyer, may be ground for finLing a warranty.
24 Barb. 549. In the relation to the construction of sale
warranty is an express promise that the article shall answer
an express purpose, or promise that the article shall answer
a particular standard of quality, and that promise is a
condition .ntil the sale is executed.
A condition is a representation which if it cannot be
shown to have had so materiala part in determining the
consent as to have formedif not the basis of the contract,
at any rate an 9ntegral part of its terms, then it receives
th3 name of a warranty. Anson. Its truth does not affect
the formation of the contract but gives to the inju ed party
a right of action excontractu, for loss sustained by the
untruth of the statement. Benn. v. Burness 41 & W.
Some writers for the convenience ofl Ame illustration
divide the implied 'Jar-anty, into the different kinus ac-
cording to the different kinds of actions that can be brough
on them, or fmomjdture of the representation. As first;
1. A warranty of identity or genuineness.
11. Of the sale of, goods by description that the article
is merchantable.
1I. The implied waarranty on the sale by sample that the
goods correspond to the same.
IV. The implied warranty that the goods shall be fit to the
buyers purpose.
v. Implied warranty of title.
Vl. The implied warranty from custom.
The first of these warranties, that is a wearranty
as to the general character of the article sold,does not
convey any other fact than that the article is of the kind
which is contracted for or sold, and this Joes not
apply to any defect that can be seen by the purchaser
as if he should say that the article ws pure sand in the
wagon and he could have seen that there was more than one
half of the load that was dirt or gravel by the mere
inspection of the load. Not waithstanuing the sale may be
made with ,- written warranty; yet if ',he,-e has be:;n any
wilful misrepresentation or concealment or fraud by the vendoV'
either as to the kiid,quality or other particUlar of the
article sold, he ma.y bring his action for damages for 'he
fraud S Barn& Cress. C23.
If a person at the time of selling a horse says,
I never wrrant, but he is sound as far as I know"" this
is a qualified warranty, and the purchaser may maintain
his action upon itif he can show that the horse was unsounu
to ,he knowledge of the seller. 5 Man.& Ryl.124.
It has been held by our surpreme court, that the mere
discription of the article in a bill or parcle,as to the
article calling it brazilletto wood,wrhen it was peachunm
wood,and worth little or nothing,was not a warrant'y that it
was of the kind described. It appears in that case that
the defendant was the agent for a house in new Providence,
from which hvi received the wood in question. It was invoiced
as brazilletto; he advertised it as such, desciribed it as
such in the bill of parcels, and the plaintiffs agent
selected it from other woods, supposing i. -o be the bra-
zilletto, and both parties supposed that the wood was in fact
the same as described. And so, under such similar circum-
stancls, t e es the defendnt sold to the TIaintiffs paint
for good Spanish b rown and 'hite lead, which proved to be
bad, and if nu value, it was held that no action lay. So
where the contract :.as to c eliver cloth called blue Guineis
but the delivery Was of a _ irferent kind f cloth, of an
inferior quality; it was held that no action would lie for
the damages, arising to the vendee. And so, where the article
sold ffas described by the seller 'is barilla, )ut which
turned out to be kelp, an article greatly rosembling
barilla, but of little or no value, it was held that no
action would lie.l Cow. 354.
What constitutes a warranty that the goods are merchant
able ,- Nothing is more common than for merchants and others
in selling goods,to recomend them highly to the purchaser
as of a superior quality, and a3 having cost so much, and
as being worth so much more than the price at which they
offer them for sale; and yet, if the fact shoulu turn out
to be otherwise, an action would not lieunless fraud or
warranty could be made out;for the goods are exposed to
the examination of the buyer, -ind h' shoula judge for him-
self, and if he places implicit confidence in the opinion
of the seller, he does so at his peril; the " maxim Caveat
emptor'applies with peciliar force to tIese cases and if
he wishIes to be safe Le must exact a. vivrranty. I Cow. 137.
In Galla3gher- v. Waring, 9 Wend. -0. It was helu that
on a sale of cotton in bales,without a sample or exam-
ination, and when the inspection of the article was equally
accessiole,and its quality equally known to both parties,
there was an implied warranty tlhat the article was
merchantable. So in the case of Hermon v. Wager, on a sale
by a commission merchantit was held, th-at as the defendant
had an opportunity ( The articles being in balesand its
intrinsic merits equally known to both parties) to examine
the bulk of the article soldc,he 'ras entitled to expect a
merchantaole article;and that having bought it with the
knowledge of the seller, the article for a particular pu'-
posehe 'vis entitled to an article which would answeE to
that purpome. These last cases go quite as far as any of
the English eases and trench deeply upon the cormmon law,
maxim,of !Caveat emptor; anu I cannot but think that the ohL
rule,and the old decisions down to the time of Seixas v.
Wood, were the safestanL wisest guides; and that the new
doctrine carriec. to this extent,will lead to much difficulty
and vexation". 7Tote Jlent 635.
In Ihowar1 V. Jiocy, 23 Mend. 350. The suprome court of
Sstrongly enforced t e uistinction -ctw)'n oxecute, anL
executory contracts. It ha3 declared, that in a contract
of sale of an article of iinerchandise at a future hLwy,
where there is no selection or sug estion or setting apart
at the time of the -pecific articles , so as to pass the
property (N PRESRNTI, merchantab]l quality, being the avera-
price, is intendeu. In the case of an executed sale an
express warranty of quality is necessary to bind the vendor
in the absence of fraud. But if the sale is executory,
or .o deliver an article not defined at the timeor a futur:>.
day, there is an implied warranty that the article shall
be at least of medium good quality or, merchantable.
And it may be returned after the buyer has had a reasonable
time to inspect the article.
That i3 necessaryto constitute a warranty where a sale is
made by sample.In order to raise an implied warranty that tlie
bulk of the article is of a quality equal to the same or
the 3ample, it is necessary to show by the circbmstances
of the case,that the sale was intended by tile parties to be
by sample.It is not enough that a sample dran from the
bulk is ;hown , for the purchaser in that case purchases at his
peril. In a sale by sample of cotton, the law implies a warranty
that tle bulk ef the article corresponds with the sample ex-
hibited; where,th.refore, cotton was sold in bales and the sample
exhibitedwas of good quality, and on opening the bales it was
found that they were packed in the interior with masses of
damaged cotton, it was held that the purchaser was e'titled to
recover the damage sustained by him.
The mere exhitition of samples at the time of sale,is not
of itself evidence of an agreement to sell by sample; it is for the
jury to say from all circumstamces of the case whther the sale
was intended by the parties aa a sale by sample. Ther is unques-
tionably a very material difference betweent the rules of the
civil law on the subject of implied warranties of sale,and the
rules of the common law on the same subject;the latter is the
law of this state. By the Civil lawif there was eror either
as to thesubstance of the thingwhich was intended to be sold or,
purchased,or as to any of its essential qualities,without which
it wouldlbe the article for which it was soldthere would be no
valid sale. But by the common law the sale would be binding in such
a case,unlessthe article soldwas in such a situation that it could
not be s en and examined. By the parties . A sale by sample
however does not come within tiie principles of the common law,
that the 1u-chaser must look out fof' himself,as every agreement
to sell by sample doepfrom its very nature contain an impliedif
not an express warranty,th-t the bulk of the article sold cor-
responds with such sample.
Warranties made upon the sale of chattels, are, with the
folloti'ng exceptions, express and not implied contracts, and
must be made at the timeof the sale, or prospectively in view
of it. If upon a treaty about buying certain goods the seller
warrants themthe buyer takes time for a few days,and then gives
the seller his price,though the warmant was made before the sale ,
yet this will be well, because the warrant was the ground of the
treatyll WeN. 580.
The vendor without any special contract, warrants his title
to the goods sold, if they are in his possession ; otherwise
not. In the sale from defendant to plaintiff there was no
pfoof of any express warranty of title; nor was any such proof
necessary. The fair and reasonable construction of the evidence
is that the defendant had possession of the property and at the
time of the sale and transfer-red it to the plaintiff on his
pying the purchase money. Possession of personal property
implies titbe, and in every case of the s&le of personal property
in possession, there is an implied warranty of title in the vendor
40 N.Y. 285. Burt v. Dewy. But in all cases where the person
does not profess to sell the goods as his own there is no warranty
of title,for the person who buys the article,or from the person
who owns the property. There is a warranty implied in he trqns-
fer of every negotiable instrument that is not forged. Herrick
v. Whitney . 15 John. 240.
CuStom is law established by long usage.An universal
custom becomes common law. If usage be confined to a particular
place it is a custom. What is a customary warranty of title ,-
It requires strong evidence of a settled or uniform usage,
or a particular mode of dealing betweenthe parties to establish
it. .o custom in this Statecan be allowed to control the gen-
eral rules of the common law; a less, indeed, a custom of such
antiquity, th- t we cannot trace its origin; for then it is coeval
with the connon law itself;and in such a case it form s an
exception to the general rule;because there is ground to presume
that it is of equal authority, and that the same power, which
established the rule , also made the exception. 16 John. L FO.
A custom must be reasonable and not contrary to the
general principles of the law. A usage of a particular
trade may be proved with a view of raising the presumption
that the parties contracted with the knowledge of it, so
that it entered into and became part of the contract.
In such a case it must be shown that the parties against
whom the usage is set up had notice of it at the time of the
contract,or must be shown to have so long continued,univer-
sal and notorious that the person may 4e presumed to have
had notice of it 03 Barb. 500.
The rule of law requiring the protest of a foreign bill
of exchange is wholly founded on the custom of merchants: and
in an action against a notary for neglect to make presentment
and demand, evidence that it is the conxnon and universal
usage at the place where the bill is paid or payable for
notaries clerks to make such presentments and demand
and that the bill in question was presented and demand of
payment by tie clerk of the defendant,is proper and admissable.
A knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of this Asage iA
not necessary to its validity/. 49 N.Y. 209. Commercial Bank
of Kentucky v. Varnum.
The warranty of the place depenuds on the general custom
as known and understood by the parties at the timeof making
the contract and if O*e person is in the habit by custom of
receiving such goous from the person or firm and it is a
known custom that such goods are expected from him he will De
bound to warrant the ar-icle to be such as is expected by
the parties who are in the habit of ordering such goods.
Where an article has been sold with a warnanty whether
express or implied,and whether by sample or otherwise upon its
b-each an action for damages may be brought without offering
to return the article or give notice of the defect.And the
purchaser may recover his damages although he sells the articl
18 Wend. 425. supra.
In case of an executory contract,the parties at the time
of receiving the goods may refuse to take them or within a
reasonable time thereafter if there has been no acquiescence
in, or exceptance of the goods by any act of the.; parties
they may refuse to take the goods ana tender them back and
demand the payment of the purchase money for the goods. But
if the contract is one called an executed contract then there
is a different rule and the parties to the contract are
limited to the amount of damages that they have sustained
by the loss of tije article or the difference between the
price of the article and the price of tne article as it is
at the time with its defects, as could be sold upon the marhet.
An actioa for damages for alledged breach of warranty
upon a con-ract to sell and deliver to the plaintiffs,
at a future day eight barrels of rock candy syrup. The con-
tract of sale with warranty was proved,or sufficiently for t .o
jury and the breach; out it also appeared in the proofs
that the plaintiffs, after receiving the syrup, and dis-
covering its failure to comply with the warranty, proceeded
to use it in the business of wine manufacture, and neither
returned or offered to return it.Upon this ground the plain-
tiffs , on defendants motion , were nonsuited at the circuit.
It appeared that the plaintiffs required and desired to
purchase for their business, in a western county, -an article
of rock candy syrup " That would not crystalize, or the sugar
fall down", in its use. The question is did the plaintiffs
claim for damages survive their acceptance ind use of the
syrup, or were they bound to return or offer to return the
defective syrup as soon as its defects were discovered.
It is well settled that, upon a sale and delivery
IN PRESENTI, of goods with expres warranty, if the goods upon
trial or full examination turn out to be defectiveand there
is a breach )f warranty, the vendee may retain and use the
prop'.rty, and may have his remedy upon the warranty without
returning or offering to return. IN factit seems to be
settled in theiS state,though, perhaps not necessarily de-
termined in any case that he has no right to .-eturn the goods
in such a case,unless there was fraud in the sale.
In a present sale with warranty it is expectedof course
that the vendor incurs the peril of defects in the property
warranted,after its delivery to the purchaser and he warrants
against that. Ee does precisely the same in awarranty in
an executory contract. Hewman v. Frost. 5J2N.Y. 410.
What is the measure of damages on a breach of warranty,-
The damages for which a party may recover for a breach of con-
tract are such as ordinarily follow from the nonpreformance.
They must be proximate and certain or capable of certainty,
and not remote , speculative or contingent.
It is persumed that the parties contemplated the usual and
natural consequences of a breach when the contract is made;
and if the contract is made with refference to special
circumstances, fixing or affecting th;e amo'lnt of W'mages,
such special circumstances are egarded within the contem-
plation of the parties,and damages n tay be assessed accordingly.
For a breach of an executory contract to sell and deliver
personal property the measure of damages are ordinarily
the difference betwern the contract price and the market
value of the article at the time and place of delivery;
but if the contract is made to enable the plaintiff to pre-
form a sub contract,the terms of which defendant knows,
he may be held liable for the difference betwen the sub con-
tract price and the principle contract price, and this is
upon the ground that the parties have impliedly fixed the
measure of damages themselves, or, rather, made the contract
upon the basis of a fixed rule by which they may be assessed.
Booth V,. S.D. Rolling Mill Co. 6O N.Y. 487. Finis.

